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D.

SMITH*

I.
the faceJoseph Vining-personal in
with years
encountersome
first personal
ago when I spent a semester at
Y
sense-occurred
to-face
the University of Michigan. Joe and I were in some respects from quite
different worlds, but we seemed to have converging concerns, interests,
and questions, and so we began to meet regularly for lunch and conversation. We talked about law, and life, and faith-for Joe, of course, these
subjects are not really severable'-and I felt I began to gain some limited
comprehension (and I emphasize the limited) of his way of thinking, which
had previously been for me pretty much inscrutable. A decade-and-a-half
(and untold conversations) later, I still struggle to comprehend whatJoe is
2
thinking, and to figure out what I think about it. As I now understand,
the purpose of much of Joe's work is precisely to induce just this sort of
reflection.
During one lunch conversation, I ventured to askJoe whether he believed in God. I recall his answer (though I'm not sure he would give the
same answer today). "I can say this much-" Joe said, carefully, even
gravely, and it seemed to me a bit regretfully, "that I can't not believe. Isn't
that the same as believing?" I wasn't sure.
I'm still not sure. But I've come to realize that this answer was indicative of Joe's approach to some of the most urgent, central questions. It is
an approach which I believe to be distinctive, and also illuminating and
valuable, and so I want to discuss Joe's answer and some related matters a
bit more in this short essay.

M

* @ Steven D. Smith, 2010. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of San Diego. This essay was written for the fourth annual John F.
Scarpa Conference, held at Villanova University on October 22, 2009, and
dedicated to considering the work of Joseph Vining. I thank Patrick Brennan,
Michael Perry, and participants in the Scarpa Conference for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 5 (1994) ("Such is the connection between law, mind, and cosmology that they are aspects of the same
2. For me (and I've told him this), reading Joe's work is a little like reading
the book of Isaiah. There are long stretches that are beautifully written and manifestly rich with insight and wisdom-except that I have only the vaguest understanding of what he's saying. It's over my head. And then I come to a passage of
lucid, rare, extraordinary insight that at least partly illuminates the rest and makes
the whole exercise rewarding.
(1177)
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II.
Let me start by noticing a series of different but related and overlapping dichotomies that run through much of our thinking and our language. Person and thing. Subject and object. Mind and matter. I-it. A
central part of our efforts to grasp and to act in and upon the world consists of placing the various entities we encounter on one side or the other
of these associated lines.
Nor is it predetermined that any particular entity or phenomenon
must fall into any particular category. Often, perhaps always, we have
some freedom in the matter: we can place something on the "personal,"
mindful, subjective side of the line, or on the "impersonal," objective side.
We can "personify" or we can "objectify," or "reify." And there are consequences to this placement, because each category has its distinctive qualities, and hence its distinctive attractions and limitations.
The "object" category offers solidity, reliability, predictability. Objects-think of rocks-behave according to regular, knowable laws. They
stay put (unless someone or something comes along to move them). They
are, at least in principle, subject to our control.
Entities in the "subject" or "personal" category lack these reassuring
features, but they have their own compensating virtues. They possess the
ability to have intentions, and to make choices, and to have and convey
meanings. They are capable of caring, and of believing. Mere objectsrocks, for instance-cannot do these things (unless we "personify" them).
So for different purposes, one of the categories can be more convenient or attractive than the other. If you are mostly concerned about acquiring the sort of knowledge that will provide a comforting certainty, and
that will allow you to predict and control things and events, this concern
will likely lead you to squeeze as much of life and the world as possible
into the "object" category. Conversely, if you feel the need for genuine
friendship, for instance, it will be more helpful to find something-or
rather someone-with a subjective, personal nature, and to treat that someone as a person, not (as is entirely possible) as an object to be explained,
predicted, and controlled.
In ordinary day-to-day life, most of us are, by habit or inclination or
even reflection, dualists: we instinctively or sometimes deliberately regard
some entities or phenomena as subjective or personal and others as objective. Your mother is a person. So, hopefully, is your secretary. Your car
and your computer are objects-usually anyway (because you may sometimes talk to them, or curse at them, or plead with them).
Despite this dualism at the level of practice, though, most of us also
treat (consciously or tacitly) one of the categories as primary or ultimate,
and the other as subordinate or derivative. One place this priority can
appear is in our account of the origins of everything. Thus, in Plato's
Laws, the Athenian describes two kinds of views that people take regarding
this question of primacy. Some people hold that "fire and water, earth
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and air, are the most primitive origins of all things," and that "soul is a
later derivative from them." Consequently, the world and its contents are
generated "not .. . by the agency of mind, or any god, or art, but .. . by
nature and chance." This is the more common view, the Athenian explains, "widely broadcast, as we may fairly say, throughout all mankind"
and propagated by "men who impress the young as wise." By contrast, the
other view-the one embraced by the Athenian himself-holds that "soul
came first" and that "nature" is in fact "secondary and derivative from art
3
and mind."
It is characteristic of views that we describe as "religious" to give priority to the mindful or personal side. In the beginning, God (a person)
created the world (consisting of, among other things, objects).4 In the
5
crebeginning was the Word, the Logos. And at least part of what was
6
and
God,"
of
image
the
ated-especially including us-was made "in
hence shares God's personal quality. Conversely, the overwhelmingly
dominant attitude in the academy over the last century or so has been to
give priority to the objective. Matter came first, and more complex entities (including persons, and mind) evolved out of that primordial raw material. This perspective is often described as "naturalism," and although
7
the term is of uncertain and contestable scope, it will be convenient to
use that term. The so-called hard sciences are thought to take a naturalistic perspective pretty much for granted (though perhaps only a "methodological naturalism"8 ); indeed, their devotees may treat adherents of the
contrary perspective with contempt or incomprehension.9 Other disciplines, envious, have often tried to follow what they take to be science's
10
example, or to be "sciences" themselves.
Thus, in a recent book seeking to unsettle this situation at least in a
mild way, the editors explain that "[a] n overwhelming majority of American philosophers claim to be 'naturalists' or to be offering a 'naturalistic'
theory . . . ."I' Hilary Putnam describes the common practice by which
3. PIATo, The Laws: 889b-892c, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 1225, 1446
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., A. E. Taylor trans., 1961).
4. Genesis 1:1.
5. John 1:1.
6. Genesis 1:26-27.
7. See generally Mario de Caro & David MacArthur, Introduction: The Nature of
Naturalism, in NATURALISM IN QUESTION 1 (2004).
8. For a discussion emphasizing the difference between methodological and
ontological naturalism, see Barry P. McDonald, Getting Beyond Religion as Science:
"Unstifling" Worldview Formation in American Public Education, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 587, 604, 627-30 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, Born-Again Creationism,in ARGUING ABOUT RELIGION
567 (Kevin Timpe ed., 2009).
10. Cf Philippe Nonet, Philosophy? In American Law?, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN
AMERICAN LAw 265, 265 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009) (referring to "the nearly
transparent disguise of the so-called 'sciences of man'").
11. De Caro and MacArthur, supra note 7, at 2.
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philosophers . .. announce in one or another conspicuous place

in their essays and books that they are "naturalists" and that the
view or account being defended is a "naturalist" one; this announcement, in its placing and emphasis, resembles the placing
of the announcement in articles written in Stalin's Soviet Union
that a view was in agreement with Comrade Stalin's; as in the case
of the latter announcement, it is supposed to be clear that any
view that is not "naturalist" (not in agreement with Comrade Stalin's) is anathema, and could not possibly be correct.1 2
Indeed, a great deal of modern academic work has consisted precisely
of the effort to "naturalize" one subject or another that might intuitively
seem more subjective or personal-mind, or morality, or persons themselves. Hence Sidney Morgenbesser's comment to B. F. Skinner: "Let me
see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't anthropomorphize
people?"13

I think it is fair to say that a major purpose ofJoe's work-perhaps the
central purpose-has been to resist this way of thinking. Joe does not
deny nature, of course, and he is not opposed to science. Quite the contrary: he sees profound goodness and beauty in them. 14 I am not sure
whether he has any objection to a duly constrained and humble version of
"methodological naturalism."1 5 His resistance, rather, is to what he sometimes calls "total vision," or "single vision"-the idea that the universe is
composed "merely" (a word he finds ominous) of the sorts of objective
entities that figure in scientific explanations. Thus, he quotes John
Searle's contention that the world "consists entirely of physical particles in
fields of force, and .

.

. some of these particles are organized into systems

that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves." Searle goes on to
explain that "the simple intuitive idea is that systems are collections of the
particles where the spatio-temporal boundaries of the system are set by
causal relations.... Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges are ... examples of systems." 16 This is the sort of single or total vision-a reductionist
vision-that Joe opposes.
12. Hilary Putnam, The Content and Appeal of "Naturalism," in NATURALISM IN
QUESTION, supra note 7, at 59, 59.
13. James Ryerson, Sidney Morgenbesser [b. 1921]; Sidewalk Socrates, N.Y. Times,

Dec. 26, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400
E1D81330F935A15751C 1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (emphasis
added).
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF
SCIENCE AND HUMANrrY 81 (2004) (declaring that "science brings gifts, of fascination, of beauty, of relief from pain, gifts of unclouded thought, of freedom to love;
and in fact these gifts and their effects are enjoyed even by those who live in a
world whose material constitution they deny").
15. See McDonald, supra note 8, for a discussion of "methodological
naturalism."
16. VINING, supra note 14, at 8.
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Elsewhere, Joe describes the kind of thinking that concerns him as
"mathematical thought."1 7 Again, though, the problem is not with mathematics per se, but with a form of thinking that is elevated into a
"credo" 1 8-a creed committed to "the axiomatic impersonality of the
20
world" 19 and hence to "the axiomatic elimination of the person" and of
21
In this creed, Joe de"transcendence" or the "mysterium tremendum."
22
tects "a form of death, a giving up, a farewell" to all that is meaningful
and caring and good. It is this sort of creed, he suggests, that animated
some of the atrocities of the twentieth century in which human beings
23
were treated simply as objects for scientific experimentation.
In resisting naturalist thought (which I will use here as a shorthand
for totalistic and "objectivist" creeds in general) in favor of a more personalist view, Joe is unusual in our time, but he is hardly alone. What is
distinctive, perhaps unique, is that he sets up his base of resistance not
primarily in religion, or even in the humanities, but rather in what many
would see as a most improbable place-law. Indeed, though he has some24
times pointed out the analogy between legal and theological discourse,
Joe resists any quick move to religion. Speaking (I take it) from his own
experience and struggles, he seems to view law and legal discourse as more
sure and more generally accessible than religion and theological
discourse.2 5
Law seems an unlikely base for personalism because it is often
thought of as having, or at least aspiring to, an "objective" quality: indeed,
the very ideal of "rule of law not of men" suggests an aspiration to eliminate
26
the personal from governance and from judging. Many have aspired to
17. See VINING, supra note 1, at 248.
Mathematical thought is translation of reality into process or system,
which axiomatic exclusion of substance that might transcend any process
or system. Materialism may be implicit in it, but its spread to linguistics,
literary criticism, social theory, to the psychology of mind and even to
theology makes "scientific thought" too narrow a term for it.
Id.
18. Id. at 181.
19. Id. at 187.
20. Id. at 241.
21. Id. at 329.
22. Id. at 20.
23. See generally VINING, supra note 14, at 20.
24. See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 18792 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Joseph Vining, Legal Commitments and Religious Commitments, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 69, 82 (2007).
26. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULEs (2001);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
To be sure, our legal tradition has also supported a prominent strand of skepticism, often called "legal realism," which stresses the ineradicable personal element
in judicial decisions, but legal realism is typically understood not so much as a rival

conception of what "law" is as a challenge to or subversion of the aspiration to rule

of "law." Moreover, legal realists have not exhibited any commitment to personal-
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make law a "science." 2 7 And prevalent modern accounts of legal interpre-

tation typically insist that the meaning of legal texts is determined by
something objective, such as the "rules of language." 28 The effort, as Joe
observes, is "to make law a machine."29
Joe has a contrary view. In his understanding, law, legal discourse,
legal meaning, legal authority, and even something as technical and arcane as the law of standing, are pervasively and essentially personal.30 "No
lawyer," he remarks, "can point to an it."3 1 Indeed, he suggests that
among the various disciplines, including even the so-called social or
human sciences, law is the one discipline that has not discarded and cannot discard the person. 32 And if law is personal, the implications cannot
be neatly contained. That is because, forJoe, law and legal discourse offer
a window into the universe. Or maybe it would be better to say that law
pervades and is coextensive with the universe.33 As a result, Joe's personalist understanding of law implies a personalist understanding of the cosmos
at large.
So the first and last thing we know, the ultimate object of knowledge and belief, is a person, not a principle. ... This is what we
know, what is real, what has meaning. 34
"This is what we know. . . ." But do we actually know this? How? With
these questions we come to another distinctive and intriguing aspect of
Joe's thinking, and to a point where he parts ways with most other thinkers
who join with him in resisting the prevailing naturalism.
ism in any very substantial sense; they have often sought merely to replace legal
"science" and legal reasoning with socialscience.
27. For a learned but derisive study of this aspiration, see GRAr GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw (1977).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, ConstitutionalTexting, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
123, 123 (2007).
29. VINING, supra note 24, at 5. For the record, although I myself am entirely
sympathetic toJoe's overall project, as I understand it, and skeptical of the notion
that law is or could be or should be a "science," I also happen to believe that there
is considerable value- even "moral" value, if you like, or value for persons-in the
"rule of law" aspiration to make law "objective."
30. I have tried to summarize this view elsewhere. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S
QUANDARY 170-75 (2004). On the law of standing, see JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTrry (1978).
31. VINING, supra note 1, at 241.
32. Id. at 208, 210.
33. See VINING, supra note 24 at 70-71; see also VINING, supra note 1, at 323:
The ideal of a limited law is flawed at its base. It presumes a natural order

into which there can be "intervention," when in fact there is no such

natural order, no area of liberty that might be constrained or not accord-

ing to whether decisions of law are applicable.
34. VINING, supra note 1, at 201.
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III.
Those who want to resist naturalism typically do so by making arguments calculated to demonstrate the existence of something beyond what
naturalism acknowledges, or perhaps to show that naturalism (at least its
more militant moods) is self-undermining or false. Insofar as naturalism
denies the existence of God, for instance, theists may make arguments
designed to show that God does exist. The arguments may be quasi-empirical or quasi-scientific in character, as in the so-called Argument from Design, which seems to have gained new interest on the basis of scientific
35
evidence suggesting an "anthropic principle" in the universe's design.
Or the arguments may be more purely conceptual or logical in character,
as in the so-called Ontological Argument developed by St. Anselm and
others.3 6 If these arguments are persuasive (and this is of course a large
and fiercely contested ij), the more self-aggrandizing and censorious versions of naturalism would be thereby refuted.
It is understandable that theists would proceed in this way, which we
can call "rationalist." For one thing, naturalists themselves typically revere,
and purport to speak the language of, "reason," and if you are going to
join issue with someone it is convenient if you can speak his language. For
another, if the arguments for God are successful, they would provide what
believers and others naturally desire-certainty or at least warranted confidence regarding the truth of theism.
Joe, by contrast, does not employ this rationalist method. I think he is
suspicious of it. Indeed, he may see it as capitulating to the very sort of
objectivist ontology that the personalist is trying to resist, in a couple of
ways.
First, the rationalistic approach could be viewed as attempting to coerce assent-to use reason to compel one's opponent to assent to a proposition he is not inclined to accept. This tactic may seem akin to the
manipulation or compulsion that Joe understands to be "authoritarian"
rather than "authoritative," and that is objectionable precisely because it
does not treat its subjects as persons but rather as things to be manipulated and controlled.3 7 I am not sure whether Joe would make this criticism, or whether the criticism is valid. But some such reservation seems to
35. See, e.g., Robin Collins, A Scientific Argumentfor the Existence of God: The FineTuning Argument, in ARGUING ABoUT RELIGION, supra note 9, at 147. See alsoJOHN

POLKINGHORNE, BELIEF IN GOD IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE 6-10 (1998).
36. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, Proslogion, in THE MAJOR WoRs 88-89 (Brian Davies & G. R. Evans eds., 1998). For a critical discussion of various versions of the
argument, see Peter van Inwagen, Necessary Being: The OntologicalArgument, in ARGUING ABOUT RELIGION, supra note 9, at 101.
37. The difference between the authoritative and the authoritarian, Joe explains, is the difference "between a system that treats us as if we were objects, and
which we therefore resist and push against and rightly see as one in which we have
no place which therefore cannot be part of us, and a system which, instead of
manipulating us, seeks to embrace us." See VINING, supra note 24, at 145. Indeed,
the authoritative cannot ultimately be a mere "system" at all, but must be a person
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be contained in Joe's explanation that his method is not to move "from
proposition to proposition" or to compel assent through argument.
"Binding you to me by successful moves of my mind would lose all that can
be hoped for."38
Second, the rationalist method in a sense may seem to embrace the
very objectivism it attempts to resist by treating matters under consideration as "object-like" entities. Thus, the rationalist thinker deals in propositions, claims, concepts, theories. Just what the ontological status of these
entities is, or how they fit into an overall naturalist framework, is often less
than clear. What sort of thing is a "concept," exactly? A sort of mental
state? A localized linguistic practice? A Platonic form?
I don't know, and so I want to speak tentatively. Still, in standard
academic discourse it often at least looks like these entities are somehow
just "there." They seem to float free of, and to be examinable and to stand
or fall without reference to, the persons who may be said to "hold" or
"believe" or "embrace" them. Moreover, through analysis and definition
the rationalist tries to make these entities as clear and distinct-as sharply
object-like-as possible. Thus, in the rationalist exercise, persons recede
from view, and the field is occupied by an array of seemingly impersonal
ideas, propositions, and arguments that, like chemicals in a test tube, interact to combine with or neutralize each other, and thus to produce as a
residue or product some impersonal, object-like conclusion.
In trying to describe Joe's thinking, by contrast, I have attempted to
avoid talking about propositions, and although I have had to use words
like "idea" and "view," I suspect that even these words subtly distort. In
fact, Joe seems interested not in concepts or propositions, but in what are
more like actual qualities of persons. Believing is inherently personal:
thus, Joe describes "the separation of self from ideas" as "the fundamental
error."39 A belief, it seems, is like a smile: severed from the person who
believes, or who smiles, these things simply vanish. They are nothing at
all.
Nor has Joe to my knowledge ever offered a "theory" of anything. I
suspect he would concur with the character in Hawthorne's story "The
Hall of Fantasy" who says:
"Come," said I to my friend, .... "let us hasten hence, or I shall be
tempted to make a theory-after which, there is little hope for
any man."40
In sum, Joe's approach to naturalism and similar matters is not rationalistic but rather personalistic in character. He is personalist not only in
with the qualities of caring, sincerity, and mindfulness. See id. at 157, 167-68, 23132.
38. See VINING, supra note 14, at 2.
39. See VINING, supra note 1, at 10.
40. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE,
SKETCHES 246, 255 (1987).
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his substantive views and commitments but in his method as well. He defends personalism in a thoroughly personalist way.

IV.
So, how does this personalist approach to understanding and knowledge work? I have suggested elsewhere that for Joe, the purpose of reflection is similar to what it was for Michael Polanyi (whose influence Joe
acknowledges 4 1) in a book aptly entitled PersonalKnowledge. I believe, Polanyi declared,
that the function of philosophic reflection consists in bringing to
light, and affirming as my own, the beliefs implied in such of my
thoughts and practices as I believe to be valid; that I must aim at
discovering what I truly believe in and at formulating the convictions which I find myself holding; that I must conquer my selfdoubts, so as to retain a firm hold on this programme of selfidentification.4 2
We might try to express the difference between the rationalist and
personalist approaches by saying that in the rationalist approach, the featured question is "What is true?", while in the personalist approach the
central question is "What do I (really) believe?" This contrast probably
overstates the difference, because it seems that each question is necessarily
implicit in the other: to affirm that something is true is implicitly to say that
you believe it is true, and to say that you believe something is to affirm that
you believe it is true. Even so, the primary focus of the approaches is
different.
Thus, for Joe the question of truth is absorbed into the project of
determining "what I believe," and the quest for what I believe in turn
seems essentially the same as the project of figuring out "who I am." It is
all a faithful response to the Delphic and Socratic exhortation to "Know
thyself." Nor is this any modest or lazy quest. Self-knowledge is dauntingly
difficult to achieve. "We hardly know ourselves," Joe remarks,4 3 and he
suggests (and I am inclined to concur) that genuine self-knowledge is
spectacularly absent in-indeed, it is virtually precluded by the very terms
and working assumptions of-much contemporary thought.
Although Joe's approach is essentially personalist in nature, however,
it is not solipsistic in the way my description thus far may have implied.
On the contrary, Joe stresses that the search for what you and I believe is a
joint, social enterprise. The prescription is not for navel-gazing but rather
conversation and mutual interrogation. Our own beliefs, he suggests, are
not immediately and infallibly known to us; rather we discover (and in
41. See generally VINING, supra note 30.
42. MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE:
LOSOPHY 267 (1958).
43. See VINING, supra note 1, at 344.

TOWARDS A PosT-CIUTICAL PHI-
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part construct) them by examining what we think we believe, how we
speak, and how we act,44 and this quest is one in which we help each
other-often by engaging in a sort of mutual cross-examination. 45
Hence the lunchtime conversations. Hence this conference.
So how does this personalist method connect to personalism in one's
substantive views or beliefs? Here there is no substitute for reading Joe's
books and working through his questions and reflections. Elsewhere I
have tried to distill down some of his thinking 46 (the part that I've managed to grasp, or think I have), but here, with apologies, I will go straight
to the conclusion. Joe thinks that the quest for self-knowledge will show,
not that naturalism is false, exactly, but that we-most of us, at least-do
not actually believe it.
We may, some of us, say we believe it. And if we say this we are not
lying, exactly. But neither are we speaking entirely authentically. We are
likely speaking from instilled habit, or from the pressure of a theory or
ideology, or under the stern and censorious tutelage of our time. But if
we examine our language, we find that the personal just keeps slipping
back in, despite efforts to exclude it.
Thus, Joe's work is filled with such instances in which a person's
words, upon close inspection, betray a belief quite the opposite of what
she thinks she is trying to say. 47 In addition, if we examine the ways we
live-what we are willing to do or not do, what we praise and deplore-we
find that we believe in more than we are willing to acknowledge. Again,
Joe's work is filled with supporting examples. 48
The point of these examples, once again, is not to convict people of
self-contradiction and thereby to compel them to disavow previous opinions. The goal, rather, is to reveal what people genuinely believe. If we
pay close attention, Joe thinks, we find that we "can't not believe" (as he
put it in his answer to my question about God) in some of the things we
often publicly deny.
Joe's personalist method is arguably more consonant than the rationalist approach is with the personalist views he defends. It is also more
unusual, even idiosyncratic, which in part helps to explain the difficulty
that many (including me) sometimes have in appreciating what he is saying. It is an intriguing, and valuable, approach, I believe. But I also wonder whether the personalist method generates problems of its own.
44. See id. at 128, 130, 189.
45. See, e.g., VINING, supra note 14, at 16-17.
46. See SMITH, supranote 30, at 170-75; Steven D. Smith, Science, Humanity, and
Atrocity: A Lauyerly Examination, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1305 (2006).
47. See, e.g., VINING, supra note 1, at 136, 140, 145, 176, 187, 249.
48. See, e.g., VINING, supra note 14, at 136. ("But Searle would stay his hand
from vivisecting a human being or pulling out a dog's nails with pliers and then
burning it alive . . . . In staying his hand, he would reveal much.").
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V.
More specifically, I wonder whether there is something self-subverting
about a more or less conscious decision to focus on "what I believe" in
contrast to asking directly "what is true?" I'm honestly not sure what to
think about this issue. Thus, I've already said that these questions are not
mutually exclusive, but rather implicitly contain each other. And I enthusiastically agree that there is much to be gained by emphasizing that it is
we human beings-we mortal, fallible, finite, physically and historically
and linguistically embodied and hence limited persons-who are asking the
questions, conducting the inquiries, and formulating the answers. Thinking that tries to ignore this vital feature of our inquiries and our knowing
is likely to go astray in debilitating, embarrassing ways: I happen to believe
that contemporary political and ethical thought is strewn with the often
quite impressive wreckage caused by this error. Even so, isn't there something worrisome about foregrounding the question of "what I believe" and
backgrounding the question of "truth"?
If we make our beliefs the central object of our inquiries, is there any
reason to be confident that, even if our inquiries are successful and we
manage to discover/construct what we believe, we will have found truth?
We might after all be repositories of error, or deception, or self-deception.
We might be the dupes of Descartes's mischievous deceiving genie. We
might be the children of traditions distorted by power, prejudice, or ignorance. Or we might be "hard-wired," as they say, to believe in a set of
useful, survival-enhancing falsehoods.
Two aspects of Joe's personalist approach may underscore the concern. First, Joe often stresses that the impersonalist world of the naturalist
creed deprives us of ultimate meaning and leaves us with "[m] adness, selfdestruction, death, and senseless command."49 For myself, I think Joe is
essentially right about this, though of course many would dispute this view.
Either way, though, the observation can provoke the suspicion that our
beliefs are being shaped more by desperation than by what we might call
epistemically legitimate factors. Who is to say that we are not like the person who thinks "I have to believe that so-and-so loves me, because otherwise my life would be barren and miserable; I just couldn't go on"? How
reliable is that sort of belief? And once we call attention to this aspect of
our believing, as Joe does, will the believing not tend to undermine itself?
Why should I trust what I believe if I come to understand that my believing
may be influenced by my revulsion against a world of "[m]adness, selfdestruction, death, and senseless command"?
Second, Joe often says that we do not merely discoverwhat we believe;
we construct our beliefs. Indeed, he says that persons themselves are constructed, or "created."5 0 More specifically, a person is formed and shaped
by loving, caring, and believing. Consequently, "for the individual there
49. See VINING, supra note 1, at 47.
50. E.g., SMITH, supra note 30, at 143, 144, 155;
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are no objective characteristics that define who he is."5 1 Instead, "[a]
human being 'has' an identity," Joe observes, "by virtue of his love of a
thing or belief in a thing. ."52 "Each of us is the embodiment of a value
or a set of values."5 3
There is an admirable consistency here: persons themselves have a
personal, not an objective, ontological status. Persons are not just "there";
they achieve the status of being persons, it seems, in a distinctly personal
way. But there are also paradoxes here, I think. A person is created by
caring and believing; but caring and believing are activities or qualities of
persons. So how can there even be caring and believing unless the person
is already present?
In addition, the observation that beliefs and persons are "constructed" or "created" may feed into the previous concern. How do we
know that we are not simply constructing ourselves and our beliefs to suit
our needs and desires-including our need to believe that life and the
world have meaning and purpose and are not given over to "the senseless,
the mad, the empty"?5 4
VI.
Joe is aware of these and similar difficulties, I think, and indeed he
often wonders and worries about our capacity for self-deception. Self-deception or "conscious illusion" is always a possibility, he thinks, and one
that in fact is often realized in our believing and our acting.55 Nor does
he shy away from doubt: although he uses the word "know," he does not
actually seem to expect much certainty on these matters-surely not any
cheap or easy certainty. His own writing is, as he puts it, a "distillation of
vacillations."56
On the contrary, it is "the mathematical form of thought" that
promises "stability" and "an end to uncertainty"57 ; this is indeed "the
temptation of the mathematical."5 8 The personalist view, by contrast, can51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See VINING, supra note 30, at 152-53.
See id. at 148.
See id. at 157.
See VINING, supra note 1, at 43.
See, e.g., VINING, supra note 24, at 110-31;

VINING,

supra note 1, at 34, 145,

200 ("As in all large matters, there is a mixture, the usual combination, of doubt
and belief, made easier to live with, as usual, by strong doses of self-deception.").
However, Joe doubts the possibility that everything is deception. "Deception is deception only against the possibility of truth. If truth never is, neither is there deception." Id. at 141.
56. See VINING, supra note 1, at 343.
57. See id. at 54.

58. Id. at 73.
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not promise these comforts. We live "[i] n a world of faith that something
is there to be known but little direct assurance that it is known."59
Consequently, Joe often emphasizes the need for "faith."6 0 However,
clarifications are needed to avoid misunderstanding this call for "faith"
(which Joe acknowledges is "a notion in some academic trouble"6 1 ).
First, Joe is clearly not using the word in the deprecating Pudd'nhead
Wilson sense in which "faith is believing what you know ain't so."6 2 Nor is
there any divide for Joe between "faith" and "reason," or "faith" and empirical evidence. On the contrary, he stresses that a belief in the personal,
and in the transcendently personal, is itself more faithfully empirical than
the naturalistic insistence on ignoring or explaining away much that we do
in fact experience. 6 3
Part of what we in fact experience is a sense of what is "variously described as grace calling to free man, conscience calling to fallen man, the
authentic calling to the inauthentic." 64 Indeed, even the meaningful denial of God may depend on some experience of what is being denied, and
may thus provide some evidence of God. 65 Once again, the point is not
the logical one of the Ontological Argument, in which the denial of God is
said to contradict and thus negate itself, but rather a more experiential
observation about what people really believe.
Second, Joe conceives of acts of faith being validated by the experience which they produce. Our creating is not unconstrained or ex nihilo,
and believing and constructing are for him not distinct activities.6 6 We
"construct" persons and beliefs, he suggests, on the hope and the assumption that there is something there to warrant and confirm our construc59. See id. at 277; see also id. at 179 ("We do not know where the presences of
which we are conscious begin and end. They are not things. We do not fully grasp
them.").
60. E.g., VINING, supra note 1, at 34.
61. Id. at 110.
62. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD
132 (1899).
63. See VINING, supra note 1, at 34-35, 183; see also id. at 144 ("The biologist of
the positive assertion simply excludes from the evidence his own experience of
love, or meaning, or purpose, of language, of death, of beauty."); id. at 329-30
("The world is full of oddnesses and incongruities, and this is not the least of them,
this departure from the empirical taken by so many whose chief pride is their
empiricism.").
64. See id. at 332.
65. The discussion of what God is would be discussion of experience, not
of a concept or of the definition of a word. And as the discussion proceeded, if the person asserting "There is no God" did seem to the listener
to know what he was denying the existence of, that person so speaking
would more and more be evidence to the listener of the existence of God
and to be asserting the existence of God in his denial of it.
Id. at 140.
66. Id. at 186 ("But, in law or elsewhere, one must believe in the person or
meaning assumed, before person or meaning can be created. Only if there is belief can there be creation.").
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tion,6 7 and if we are right we find that the constructing is also "a merging
with something beyond us that is not us and acts through us .... ."68
Joe attempts to illustrate this somewhat elusive claim with the example of music.
The voice that speaks through a modern instrument is not the
original voice, in the sense that it is the same voice (any more
than Shakespeare spoken without Elizabethan accent and pronunciation is the same). It is a voice merged with our own. But
we cannot say that because the voice is not the same in this sense,
we then do not hear the voice or it is not the voice of the composer that we hear.6 9
Something analogous happens, he suggests, with belief in law, which
presupposes an authority beyond the finite, selfish, long-since-dead
humans who wrote and voted for the words printed in the Constitution or
the statute books. 70
So if there is an answer to the doubts I have raised about Joe's personalist approach, I think the answer itself will ultimately be a personal
one. Which seems fitting. We act without certainty but with faith-faith
that there is some sort of authority in law, and faith that the universe is
more than mindless particles in pointless motion. Both as lawyers and as
persons, we believe (in part because we necessarily presuppose) that there
is "spirit," or "mind," or a transcendent something or someone who is personal, and who is caring and cognizant of our halting, uncertain efforts. 7 '
Without this faith, we would remain oblivious: that is because "[m]ind is
not known before it is searched for."72 In acting on this faith, we do not
act blindly, moreover, but rather on the basis of careful examination into
what we really believe and who we are, and into what is presupposed by
what we do and say and believe. Still, we might be deceiving ourselves.
And if so, our faith-and our lives-will remain bare and ultimately
meaningless.
But if our faith is well-founded, then we will find ourselves engaged
with an authoritative, caring mind that "draws [us] into the spirit of it."73
And so it will turn out that "the first and last thing we know, the ultimate
object of knowledge and belief, is a person . . . ."

67.
is living
68.
69.

See id. at 141, 336 ("That the reader is constructing and joining that which
beyond is assumed, unnoticed while the work continues . .
Id. at 190.
Id. at 332-33.

70. Id. at 157, 200, 222.

71. Id. at 157, 200, 222.
72. Id. at 179.
73. Id. at 157.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss6/7

14

